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Abstract. This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for a general class
of N-person, binary-choice games. Applications include: participation games, voting, market
entry, binary step-level public goods games, the volunteer’s dilemma, etc. A simple graphical
device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a "quantal
response" equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise
in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based
on these games can be explained in this manner.
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I. Introduction
Many games have a simple binary-choice structure, with payoffs for each decision
depending on others’ decisions. For example, entry games often have the property that entrants’
profits depend on the number of entrants, e.g. the awarding of a prize randomly to one of the
entrants. Similarly, the decision of whether to go to a particular restaurant or bar may depend
on how likely it is that too many others also decide to go. Entry decisions in this context are
known as the "El Farol" dilemma, named after a popular bar in Santa Fe (Morgan, Dylan, Bell,
and Sethares, 1999). In other examples, the payoffs for each decision may be contingent on
getting a minimal number of decisions of a certain type, e.g. a minimal number of contributors
to a step-level public good, or a majority of legislators voting in favor of a legislative pay raise
* This research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9818683). We would like to thank
Susan Laury and participants at the Caltech quantal response workshop for helpful comments.that they all want but prefer not to support if it will pass otherwise (Ordeshook, 1986, Chapter
3). Sometimes the minimal number of participants needed is only one, as in the "volunteer’s
dilemma," where all players are better off if at least one of them incurs a cost from vetoing an
option, attempting a dangerous rescue, or volunteering to perform a task that benefits them all.
There have been a number of laboratory experiments involving binary choice participation
games. Kahneman (1988) first reported an experiment in which the number of entrants was
approximately equal to the market "capacity" parameter that determined whether or not entry was
profitable. He remarked: "To a psychologist, it looks like magic." Subsequent experiments have
been based on similar models, and the general finding is that players are able to coordinate entry
decisions in a manner that roughly equates expected profits for entry to the opportunity cost
(Ochs, 1990; Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale, 1995). This successful coordination has been
explained by models of adaptation and learning (Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Saving, 1992;
Erev and Rapoport, 1998). However, the "magic" of efficient entry coordination has been called
into question by recent experimental results. For example, Fischbacher and Thöni (1999)
conducted an experiment in which a monetary prize is awarded to a randomly selected entrant,
so the expected prize amount is a decreasing function of the number of entrants. Over-entry was
observed, and it was more severe for larger numbers of potential entrants. This over-entry
pattern is somewhat intuitive but is not predicted in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where the
number of actual entrants reduces expected profits to a constant, independent of the number of
potential entrants. In contrast, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) report under-entry and positive net
payoffs in the baseline treatment of a market entry game. In addition, they find over-entry in a
treatment where post-entry payoffs depend on a skill-based competition. Rapoport, Seale, and
Ordonez (1998) review some of these studies and conclude that over-entry is more likely when
the Nash probability of entry is low and under-entry when the Nash entry probability is high.
Another participation game that has received attention from experimenters is the
"volunteer’s dilemma," in which all players receive a benefit B if at least one of them incurs a
cost, C < B, of "volunteering" to perform a task, like attempting a dangerous rescue, or issuing
a politically risky veto. In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, an increase in the number of
potential volunteers will reduce the probability that any one person volunteers, which is intuitive,
and will decrease the probability that at least one person volunteers, which is unintuitive.
2Experimental data support the intuitive prediction but not the unintuitive one (Franzen, 1995).
Similarly, laboratory results for binary coordination and public goods games support some
theoretical Nash predictions, but also generate data patterns that are intuitive but not explained
by standard game theory, as discussed below.
The objective of this paper is to explore the common structural elements of a wide class
of binary-choice games, and to provide a unified theoretical perspective on seemingly
contradictory results, like the positive relationship between over-entry (or the probability of
getting a volunteer) with the number of potential entrants (or volunteers). The analysis is based
on the incorporation of "noisy" behavior into models of equilibrium and adaptive adjustment
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985, 1988; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 1999).
Section II presents the model of a general class of N-person binary choice games. Market entry
games and the volunteer’s dilemma are considered in Sections III and IV respectively, and the
resulting participation probabilities are compared with those of a Nash equilibrium. This
comparison allows an analysis of anomalies like excess participation relative to the Nash
benchmark. Models with positive externalities, e.g. step-level public goods games, are considered
in section V, where the object is to explain data patterns that are not predicted by Nash. Section
VI applies this approach to the analysis of a voting participation game, where voters are of two
types and must decide whether or not to incur the cost of voting. The focus is on explaining the
effects of the outcome rule (majority or proportional) on the participation probabilities. The final
section concludes.
II. To Participate or Not?
A symmetric N-person participation game is characterized by two decisions, which we
will call participate and exit. The payoff from participation is a function of the total number, n,
who decide to participate, which is denoted by p(n), defined for n £ N. In a market entry game,
for example, the payoff for all entrants may be a decreasing function of the number, n, who
enter. The expected payoff for the exit decision will be denoted by c(n), which is typically non-
decreasing in n (the number of players that enter). In many applications, c(n) is simply a
constant that can be thought of as the opportunity cost of participation, but we keep the more
3general notation to include examples where a higher number of participants has external benefits
to all, including those who exit (e.g. step-level public goods games).
A strategy in this game is a participation probability, p Î [0, 1]. In order to characterize
a symmetric equilibrium, consider one player’s decision when all others participate with
probability p. Since a player’s own payoff is a function of the number who actually participate,
the expected payoff for participation is a function of the number of other players, N-1, and the
probability p that any one of them will participate. Assuming independence, the distribution of
the number of other participants is binomial with parameters N - 1 and p. This distribution,
together with the underlying p(n) function, can be used to calculate the expected participation
payoff, which will be denoted by p
e(p, N-1). More precisely, p
e(p, N-1) is defined to be the
expected payoff if a player participates (with probability 1) when all N-1 others participate with
probability p. Similarly, c
e(p, N-1) is the expected payoff from exit when the N - 1 others
participate with probability p.
Equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium, players choose the participation decision that yields the highest
expected payoff, or randomize in the case of indifference. Our goal is the explanation of
"anomalous" data from laboratory experiments, so it is convenient to model a type of noisy
behavior that includes the rational-choice Nash predictions as a limit case. One way to relax the
assumption of noise-free, perfectly rational behavior is to specify a utility function with a
stochastic component. Thus the expected payoff for participation, p
e, and the expected payoff
for exit, c
e, are each augmented by adding a stochastic term µ ei, where µ > 0 is an "error"
parameter and the ei represent identically and independently distributed realizations of a random
variable for decision i = 1 (participate) or 2 (exit). The utility of participation is greater if p
e+µ
e 1 >c
e+µe 2, so that when µ = 0 the decision with the highest expected payoff is selected, but
higher values of µ imply more noise relative to payoff maximization. This noise can be due to
either errors (e.g. distractions, perception biases, or miscalculations that lead to non-optimal
decisions), or to unobserved utility shocks that make rational behavior look noisy to an outside
observer. Regardless of the source, the result is that choice is stochastic, and the distribution of
4the random variable determines the form of the choice probabilities.
1 The participation decision
is selected if p
e +µe 1>c
e+µ e 2 , or equivalently, if e2 - e1 <( p
e- c
e )/µ, which occurs with
probability:
where F is the distribution function of the difference e1 - e2. Since the two random errors are
(1)
identically distributed, the distribution of their difference will be "symmetric" around 0, so F(0)
= 1/2.
2 The error parameter, µ, determines the responsiveness of participation probabilities to
expected payoffs. Perfectly random behavior (i.e. p = 1/2) results as µ ®¥ , since the argument
of the F( ) function on the right side of (1) goes to zero and F(0) = 1/2 as noted above. Perfect
rationality results in the limit as µ ® 0, since the choice probability converges to 0 or 1,
depending on whether the expected participation payoff is less than or greater than the expected
exit payoff.
Equation (1) expresses the participation probability as a "noisy best response" to the
expected payoff difference. This equation characterizes a quantal response equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) if the participation probability p in the expected payoff expressions
on the right is equal to the choice probability that emerges on the left.
3 Without further
parametric assumptions, there is no closed-form solution for the equilibrium participation
probability, but a simple graphical device can be used to derive theoretical properties and
characterize factors that might cause systematic deviations from Nash predictions. To this end,




The determination of the equilibrium participation probability is illustrated in Figure 1. As p
1 For instance, a normal distribution yields the probit model, while a double exponential distribution gives rise to
the logit model, in which case the choice probabilities are proportional exponential functions of expected payoffs.
2 More formally, Pr(e1 £e 2 ) = 1/2, so Pr(e1 - e2 £ 0) = F(0) = 1/2.
3 The quantal response equilibrium, developed by political scientists (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), has been
applied to the study of international conflict by Signorino (1999). A general introduction to the usefulness of the quantal
response approach in the analysis of political data can be found in Morton (1999).
5goes from 0 to 1, µ F
-1(p) increases from -¥ to +¥, as shown by the curved dark line with a
Figure 1. Quantal Response and Nash Mixed Participation Probabilities
for Low-N and High-N Cases
positive slope in the figure.
4 Since the expected payoff difference is continuous in p, it has to
cross the µF
-1(p) line at least once, which ensures existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
5 If the
expected payoff difference p
e(p, N-1) - c
e(p, N-1) is decreasing in p, the intersection will be
unique. This case is illustrated in Figure 1, where the negatively sloped dashed line on the left
4 To see this, note that an expected payoff difference of -¥ on the vertical axis will cause the participation
probability to be 0, and an expected payoff difference of +¥ will cause the participation probability to be 1. This is why
the dark "inverse distribution" line starts at -¥ on the left side of Figure 1 and goes to +¥ on the right.
5 The existence of quantal response equilibria for normal-form games with a finite number of strategies is proved
in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and for normal-form games with a continuous strategy space in Anderson, Goeree, and
Holt (1999).
6side of the figure represents the expected payoff difference. This line intersects the "inverse
distribution" line at the equilibrium probability labeled QRE on the left. Also, notice that the
point where the dashed expected payoff difference crosses the zero-payoff line constitutes a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, since players are only willing to randomize if expected payoffs
for the two decisions are equal. This crossing point is labeled "NE Mix" in the figure.
Next consider the intuition for why the quantal response equilibrium is not typically at
the intersection of the expected-payoff-difference line and the zero-payoff horizontal line in the
figure. With equal expected payoffs for participation and exit, the person is indifferent and since
F(0) = 1/2, the stochastic best response to such indifference is to participate with probability 1/2.
In the figure, this result can be seen by starting where expected payoffs are equal at the NE Mix
point on the left and moving horizontally to the right, crossing the dark line at p = 1/2. This is
not a quantal response equilibrium since the p we started with (at the NE Mix) is not the
stochastic best response to itself. To find a stochastic best response to any given entry
probability p on the horizontal axis, first move in the vertical direction to find the associated
expected payoff difference, and then move horizontally (left or right) to the dark line, which
determines the stochastic best response to that expected payoff difference. Equilibrium requires
that the stochastic best response to the others’ participation probability is that same probability,
which occurs only at the intersection of the expected-payoff-difference and inverse distribution
lines in the figure. To summarize, a symmetric quantal response probability is a stochastic best
response to itself, whereas a symmetric Nash equilibrium probability is a best response to itself.
6
As long as the expected payoff difference is decreasing in p, it is apparent from Figure
1 that any factor that increases the expected payoff difference line for all values of p will move
the intersection with the dark inverse distribution line to the right, and hence raise the quantal
response equilibrium probability. In an entry game, for example, the original p(n) function
would be decreasing if profits are decreasing in the number of competitors, and it is then
6 At the "NE Mix" point in Figure 1, expected payoffs are equal and any probability is a best response, so the NE
Mix probability is a best response to itself.
7straightforward to show that p
e(N-1, p) is a decreasing function of both arguments.
7 When the
opportunity cost payoff from not entering is constant, it follows that the expected payoff
difference p
e(p,N-1) - c
e(p,N-1) is decreasing in p and N, so a reduction in the number of
potential entrants will shift the dashed line in the figure upward and raise the quantal response
(QRE) probability, as represented by a comparison of the high-N case on the left with the low-N
case on the right.
The effect of additional "noise" in this model is easily represented, since an increase in
the error parameter µ makes the µF
-1(p) line steeper, although it still passes through the zero-
payoff line at the midpoint, p = 1/2, in Figure 1. This increase in noise, therefore, moves the
quantal response equilibrium closer to 1/2, as would be expected. In contrast, as a reduction in
µ makes the µF
-1(p) line flatter, and in the limit it converges to the horizontal line at zero as the
noise vanishes. In this case, the crossings for the QRE and mixed Nash equilibria match up, as
would be expected.
Next, consider coordination-type games where participation can be interpreted as an
individual decision of whether or not to help with a group production process that will only
succeed if enough people help out. In such games, it does not pay to participate unless enough
others do, so p(n) will be less than c(n) for low n and greater than c(n) for high n. Thus the
right side of (1) is increasing in the probability of participation. This property may result in
multiple quantal response equilibria since there can be multiple intersections when both the
expected-payoff-difference and the inverse distribution lines are increasing in p (see Figure 2).
With multiple crossings, any factor that shifts the expected payoff difference line upward will
move some intersection points to the left and others to the right. Thus the comparative statics
effects are of opposite signs at adjacent equilibria, and we need to use an analysis of dynamic
7 Intuitively, holding N fixed, a higher probability of entering means that more people enter, which results in a
lower expected payoff of entry. Similarly, holding p fixed, a higher number of potential entrants results in more entry.
This can be made more precise as follows: suppose N is fixed and the entry probability is p1. Let the number of entrants
be determined by drawing a random number that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] for each player. If the number is less
than p1 a player enters, otherwise the player stays out. When the probability of entering increases to p2 > p1, the number
of entrants is at least the same as before for all possible realizations of the random variables, and greater for some
realizations. (When a player’s random variable is less than p1 it is certainly less than p2, leading to the same entry
decision, and when it lies between p1 and p2, the player’s decision changes from staying out to entering.) Likewise, when
p is fixed, an increase in the potential number of entrants means that for all possible realizations of players’ random draws,
the number of entrants is the same or higher, which makes the expected payoff from entry be the same or lower.
8adjustment to restrict consideration to equilibria that are stable (the Samuelsonian
Figure 2. Quantal Response and Nash Mixed Participation Probabilities
for a Game with Positive Externalities
"correspondence principle"). A simple dynamic model can be based on the intuitive idea that the
participation probability will increase over time when the "noisy best response" to a given p is
higher than p. Thus dp/dt > 0 when F((p
e(p,N-1) - c
e(p,N-1))/µ) > p, or equivalently, p would
tend to increase when p
e(p, N-1) - c
e(p, N- 1 )>µF
-1(p) and decrease otherwise. For example,
start at p = .6 in Figure 2, which gives a positive expected payoff difference and a stochastic best
response of almost .9, found by moving horizontally to the right. For this reason, a rightward
arrow is present at p = .6 on the horizontal axis. The other directional arrows are found
similarly, so there is an unstable QRE at about .3, with arrows pointing away. In this manner
it can be seen that the quantal response equilibrium will be stable whenever the expected payoff
difference line cuts the inverse distribution line from above.
9Notice that any factor that raises the payoff from participation, and hence shifts the
expected-payoff-difference line upward in Figure 2, will raise the QRE participation probability
if the equilibrium is stable and not otherwise. To summarize:
Proposition 1. There is at least one symmetric quantal response equilibrium in a symmetric
binary-choice participation game. The equilibrium is unique if the difference between the
expected payoff of participating and exiting is decreasing in the probability of participation. In
this case, any exogenous factor that increases the participation payoff or lowers the exit payoff
will raise the equilibrium participation probability. The same comparative statics result holds
when there are multiple equilibria and attention is restricted to stable equilibria.
It is useful to begin with a discussion of entry games since they are the simplest
application. Moreover, the quantal response properties for these games also apply to the stable
equilibria in more complex applications such as step-level public goods, volunteer’s dilemma or
voting. The reader who is primarily in one of these subsequent applications may wish to skip
any of the later sections after reading as far as Proposition 2.
III. Entry Games: Under-Entry and Over-Entry Relative to Mixed-Nash Predictions
A widely studied example that fits the binary choice framework is an entry game, in
which players choose between a "risky" entry decision with high potential payoffs but only if few
others enter and a "secure" exit payoff. For example, entry may correspond to the purchase of
a lottery ticket or the filing of an application for a limited number of public broadcast licenses.
There are N potential entrants, and we assume that if all others enter with probability 1, the
representative player would prefer to exit due to congestion, but if nobody else enters, then the
player would prefer to enter: p
e(1, N-1) < c
e(1, N-1) and p
e(0, N-1) > c
e(0, N-1). Consider a
simple three-person version of the "El Farol" problem mentioned in the introduction: each
person’s payoff from participation (going to the bar) is 1 unless both of the other people also
happen to show up, in which case the congestion reduces the payoff to 0. The exit payoff for
staying home is c, with 0 < c < 1. When both others participate with probability p, the
probability of congestion is p
2,s op
e=1-p
2 , which is less than the exit payoff c when p =1
10and greater than the exit payoff when p = 0. In this example and in all other applications
considered below, the expected payoff difference will be continuous and decreasing in p, so there
is a unique p
* for which
(For instance, in the three-person "El Farol" problem p
* =( 1-c )
1/2.) Since (2) implies
(2)
indifference, it characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The line
representing the net payoff for participation, p
e(p,N-1) - c
e(p,N-1), is decreasing in p, as shown
by the "expected payoff difference" line on the left side of Figure 1. As noted above, the
crossing of this dashed line and the horizontal line at 0 represents the solution to (2), and is
labeled "NE Mix" on the left side of the figure.
In order to compare the Nash and quantal response equilibria, note that the dashed lines
representing the differences in expected payoffs are always negatively sloped in an entry game.
First consider the high-N case in the left side, where the large number of potential entrants lowers
the expected payoff associated with a given participation probability, and the resulting mixed
equilibrium is less than 1/2. The intersection of the negatively sloped dashed line and the
increasing inverse distribution line determines the quantal response participation probability, and
this intersection will be to the right of the mixed Nash probability. The opposite occurs for the
low-N case on the right side of the graph, where the low number of potential entrants results in
a mixed equilibrium that is greater than 1/2. In this low-N case, the QRE probability is biased
downward from the Nash probability. One way to understand both cases is to note that the effect
of adding noise is to push the equilibrium towards 1/2.
8
Finally, recall that the dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the expected payoff difference
on the right side of (1). At the QRE probability on the left, net expected payoffs are negative
8 In some games with strong strategic interactions, the "snowball" effects of small amounts of noise can push
decisions away from the unique Nash equilibrium so strongly that they overshoot the midpoint of the strategy space, with
most of the theoretical density at the opposite end of the set of feasible decisions from the Nash prediction. This is the
case for some parameterizations of the "traveler’s dilemma" (Capra, et al., 1999). This prediction, that the data will be
clustered on the opposite side of the midpoint decision from the Nash equilibrium, is borne out by the experimental
evidence.
11and there is over-entry in this case of a high number of potential entrants. In contrast, the dashed
line lies above the zero line at the QRE probability on the right side, for the low-N case. This
negative relationship between the number of potential entrants and net returns from participation
is consistent with the experimental results of Fischbacher and Thöni (1999) that were discussed
in the introduction.
9 To summarize:
Proposition 2. In the quantal response equilibrium for the entry game, there is over-entry
resulting in negative net expected payoffs when the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is less than
1/2. The reverse effect, under-entry, occurs when the mixed Nash equilibrium is greater than 1/2.
Meyer et al. (1992) report an experiment in which subjects choose to enter one of two
markets. With a group size of six, profits are equalized with three in each market, so the
equilibrium probability of entry is 1/2. An immediate corollary to Proposition 2 is that in this
case QRE coincides with Nash and both predict an entry probability of 1/2. This prediction is
borne out by their data: the average of the number of people that enter each market is never
statistically different from three in the eleven baseline sessions that they report (see their Table
3), even when the game is repeated for as many as sixty periods (see their Table 5).
10
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) provide support for the QRE under-entry prediction when
the Nash probability of entry is greater than 1/2. In their experiment subjects decide whether or
not to enter a market with a fixed capacity, c. The entrants were randomly ranked and the top
c entrants divide $50 according to their rank, while all other entrants lose $10. The exit payoff
is simply 0, and the equilibrium number of entrants is (close to) c + 5. The capacities and
potential numbers of entrants were chosen such that the Nash entry probability was greater than
9 In their game, a prize worth V is awarded randomly to one of the n players who purchase a lottery ticket at cost
c,s op ( n )=V / n-c . From this it can be shown that the expected payoff difference is decreasing in p and N.
10 Meyer et al. (1992) also report some evidence that does not square with either the symmetric Nash or the quantal
response predictions of our model. In particular, the frequency with which subjects switch markets is less than the
predicted frequency (50 percent). We conjecture that this "inertia" could be explained by an asymmetric quantal response
equilibria in which some people tend to enter with higher probability than others.
12or equal to 1/2 in all treatments.
11 Under-entry occurred in all of the eight sessions in their
baseline treatment, which resulted in positive expected payoffs for entry (see their Table 4). The
net expected payoff of entry across sessions and periods was $15, which translates into under-
entry of 1-2 subjects per round.
12
The strongest evidence for the quantal response predictions in Proposition 2 can be found
Figure 3. Nash Predictions (solid line) and Observed Entry Probabilities (diamonds)
Source: Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale (1995)
11 Capacities were 2, 4, 6, or 8, yielding equilibrium numbers of entrants (c + 5) of 7, 9, 11, or 13 respectively,
which are always greater than or equal to half the group size (14-16).
12 Camerer and Lovallo (1992) also report a second treatment in which subjects are told beforehand that their
performance on sports or current events trivia will determine their payoff. This creates a selection bias, since people that
participate in the experiment are more likely to think they will rank high when they enter (i.e. they are "overconfident"),
neglecting the fact that other participants think the same ("reference group neglect"). Camerer and Lovallo propose
overconfidence and reference group neglect as a possible explanation of the over-entry that occurs in this second
treatment. This explanation is quite plausible, in that it is analogous to the failure to perceive a selection bias that causes
winners in a common-value auction to be the ones who overestimated its value. Note that overconfidence cannot be the
whole story, however, since this bias does not explain under-entry in their baseline treatment.
13in Sundali, Rapoport and Seale (1995). In their experiments, subjects received a fixed payoff of
1 for exit and an entry payoff that is increasing in market capacity, c, and decreasing in the
number of entrants: p(n)=1+2(c-n). Thus entry in excess of capacity reduces payoffs below
1, the payoff for exit. It is straightforward to derive the mixed Nash entry probability:
p
* =( c -1)/(N-1), which is approximately equal to the ratio of capacity to the number of potential
entrants.
13 The capacities for the various treatments were: c = 1, 3, ..., 19, and with groups of
N = 20 subjects, the Nash equilibrium probability ranged from p
* =0t op
*= 18/19. Figure 3
shows the entry decisions averaged over all subjects, with the Nash predictions shown as the 45
degree line. Since each subject participated in ten "runs" and there were three groups of twenty
subjects, a data point in the figure is the average of 10*3*20 = 600 entry decisions. Note that
the entry frequency is generally higher than predicted by Nash for p
* < 1/2 and lower than
predicted for p
* > 1/2, in line with the quantal response predictions.
To summarize, the quantal response analysis explains the "magical" conformity to Nash
entry predictions (e.g. Meyer et al., 1992), the under-entry in the Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
baseline, the over-entry with many potential entrants observed by Fischbacher and Thöni (1999),
and the systematic pattern of deviations from Nash predictions reported by Sundali, Rapoport and
Seale (1995). This general approach can be adapted to evaluate behavior in other contexts where
payoffs for one decision are diminished as a result of congestion effects, as the next section
illustrates.
14
IV. The Volunteer’s Dilemma
There are many situations in which a player’s decision to participate benefits others.
13 To derive this symmetric mixed equilibrium, note that the expected number of other people who enter is (N-1)p,
so if a person enters, the expected total number of entrants is 1 + (N-1)p. Then p(n) can be used to calculate the expected
payoff for entering: p
e(p, N-1) = 1 + 2 (c -1 )-( N -1) 2pand the Nash equilibrium probability of entering follows by
equating this expected payoff to the exit payoff of 1, which yields the result in the text.
14 The analysis presented here does not apply directly to the experiments reported in Ochs (1990), since his
experiments involved more than two market locations, each with different "capacities" that determined the number of
entrants which could be accommodated profitably. Nevertheless the data patterns with random regrouping ("high
turnover") are suggestive of the quantal response results derived here. The locations with the most capacity (and high
probabilities) consistently have a lower frequency of entry than required for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, whereas
the opposite tendency was observed for locations with the capacity to accommodate only one entrant profitably.
14Contributions to a public good, for instance, have positive returns for everyone involved, and
these returns are increasing in the number of contributions. In some contexts, the optimal
number of participants is one, e.g. when a volunteer is needed to perform a task like issuing a
politically risky veto or sanctioning a group member that violated a norm. The dilemma in these
situations is that volunteering is costly and players have an incentive to free ride on others’
benevolence.
In the volunteer’s dilemma game studied here (Diekmann, 1986), all players receive a
benefit B if at least one of them incurs a cost, C < B. In this case, the expected payoff of
participation, or "volunteering" is simply a constant, B-C. The expected payoff from "exiting"
follows from the observation that when the N- 1 others volunteer with probability p, there is a
(1 - p)
N-1 chance that no one volunteers, so c
e(p, N-1) = B ( 1-( 1-p )
N-1). Notice that the
volunteer’s dilemma game satisfies the assumptions underlying Figure 1, i.e. the difference
between the expected payoffs of participating and exiting is decreasing in p. The Nash
probability of volunteering follows by equating these expected payoffs (as per (2)) to obtain:
This probability of volunteering has the intuitive properties that it is increasing in the benefit, B,
(3)
decreasing in the cost, C, and decreasing in the number of potential volunteers, N. However, the
probability of getting no volunteers is (1-p
*)
N. By (3) the probability of getting no volunteers in
a Nash equilibrium is (C/B)
N/(N-1), which is increasing in N, with limN®¥P(No Volunteer)=C / B
> 0. Unlike the intuitive comparative statics properties mentioned before, this prediction is not
supported by experimental data. Table I reports experimental results for a one-shot volunteer’s
dilemma game with B = 100 and C = 50 (Franzen, 1995). Notice that the probability that any
person volunteers is generally declining with N, as predicted by Nash.
15 The probability that
no one volunteers, however, is decreasing in N and converges to 0 instead of C/B = 1/2.
Next, consider the quantal response equilibrium for the volunteer’s dilemma. Since the
15 Franzen (1995) reports that the group-size effect is significant at the five percent level using a chi-square test
with seven degrees of freedom.
15difference between the expected payoffs of volunteering and exiting is decreasing in the
Table I. Frequencies of Individual Volunteer Decisions (p) and of "No Volunteer" Outcomes
Source: Franzen (1995)









probability of volunteering, Proposition 1 implies that the QRE probability of volunteering is
unique, decreasing in N and C, and increasing in B. Interestingly, the introduction of (enough)
endogenous noise reverses the unintuitive Nash prediction that the probability of "no volunteer"
increases with N.
Proposition 3. In the quantal response equilibrium for the volunteer’s dilemma game, the
probability that no one will volunteer is decreasing in the number of potential volunteers for a
sufficiently high error rate, µ. Furthermore, limN®¥P(No Volunteer)=0f o ra n yµ>0 .
The proof of Proposition 3 is contained in the Appendix. The intuition is that, in the
presence of noise, the addition of potential volunteers only results in a small reduction in the
16probability of volunteering, and the net effect is that the chance that someone volunteers will
rise.
16
V. Games with Multiple Equilibria: Step-Level Public Goods Games
In some participation games the expected payoff function for participating is not
decreasing in p. For example, in a production game with shared output that is increasing in the
number of participants, the expected payoff function will typically be increasing, which permits
multiple crossings. This is intuitive, since there may exist both low-participation equilibria and
high-participation equilibria in such coordination games.
17 Another example of a game with
multiple equilibria is a step-level public goods game, where each of N players must decide
whether or not to "contribute" at cost c. If the total number of contributions meets or exceeds
some threshold n
*, then the public good is provided and all players receive a fixed return, V,
whether nor not they contributed. Here we assume that the contribution is like an effort that is
lost if the threshold is not met, so there is "no rebate."
In the standard linear public goods games without a step, observed contributions in
experiments are positively related to the marginal effect of a contribution on the value of the
public good, known as the "marginal per capita return" (MPCR). Anderson, Goeree, and Holt
(1998) have shown that a logit quantal response analysis predicts this widely observed MPCR
effect. This raises the question whether there is a similar measure or index that would predict
the level of contributions in step-level public goods games. One would intuitively expect that
contributions are positively related to the total (social) value of the public good (NV) and
negatively related to the minimum total cost of providing it (n
*c). Croson (1999) has proposed
using the ratio of social value to cost, which she calls the "step return:" SR=NV/n
*c. Based on
a meta-analysis of several step-level public goods games, she concludes "... subjects respond to
16 In the extreme case when µ ®¥ , players volunteer with probability one-half, irrespective of the number of
potential volunteers, and the chance that no one volunteers falls exponentially, since the probability of no volunteer is
2
-N.
17 Stability arguments can often be used to rule out the middle equilibrium if there are three crossings as in Figure
2. For low µ, this middle equilibrium is usually close to a mixed Nash equilibrium with "perverse" comparative statics
properties. The high- and low-participation equilibria then correspond to low-effort and high-effort pure-strategy Nash
equilibria that often arise in coordination games.
17the step return just as they correspond to the marginal per capita return (MPCR) in linear public
goods games: higher step returns lead to more contributions."
First we consider whether there is a clear theoretical basis for expecting contributions to
be positively related to step return measures. A contribution in this game pays off only when
it is pivotal, i.e. when exactly n
* - 1 others contribute, which happens with probability
where, as before, p denotes the probability that others participate. The difference between the
(4)
expected payoff of contributing or not contributing is therefore:
The right side is a single-peaked function of p, and equating its derivative to 0 yields a unique
(5)
maximum at p=(n
*-1)/(N-1). Figure 4, drawn for V =6 ,c= 1, and N = 10, shows these "hill
shaped" expected payoff difference lines for three values of the threshold: n
* = 3, 5, 8. (Please
ignore the "n
*={5,8}" line, which pertains to a multiple step case to be considered later.) In each
case there are two Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, determined by the crossings of the dashed
line with the horizontal line at zero. The inverse distribution line is plotted for the case of a
logistic distribution, i.e. F(x) = 1/(1+exp(-x)), and µ = 1. As before, the intersection of the
inverse distribution line with the dashed lines determines the quantal response equilibrium, which
is unique for all three values of the threshold.
Recall that the step return is NV/n
*c, which is increasing in N and V, and decreasing in
n
* and c. In order to evaluate these properties in the context of the quantal response predictions,
note that the bell shaped nature of the expected payoff differences imply that there may be
multiple quantal response equilibria. It follows from Proposition 1, however, that any factor that
shifts the expected payoff difference line upwards will raise the equilibrium probability in a
stable equilibrium. Since the difference in (5) is increasing in V and decreasing in c,w e
conclude that the equilibrium contribution probability will be increasing in V and decreasing in
18c, just as indicated by the step-return effect. Next consider the effects of the numbers variables,
Figure 4. Expected Payoffs Differences and the Inverse Distribution Line
for Different Thresholds in Step-Level Public Goods Games
N and n*, beginning with a somewhat informal graphical analysis (precise results are presented
in Proposition 4 below). Recall that the maximum of the expected payoff difference "hill" is at
a probability of (n
*-1)/(N-1), so an increase in N tends to shift this function to the left. Notice
that a leftward shift in the dashed line labeled n*=3i nFigure 4 will lower the equilibrium
probability, but a slight leftward shift in the line labeled n* = 8 will move the intersection point
up along the dark line, and hence will raise the quantal response equilibrium probability. Thus
an increase in N can result in a decrease in the equilibrium probability when the threshold is low
19and an increase when the threshold is high.
18 The effect of changes in the threshold, n
*, are
similar. Note that the quantal response probability of contributing does not decrease
monotonically with the threshold: when n
* increases from 3 to 5, the equilibrium probability
increases from .43 to .56, and then drops to .27 when n
* = 8. The intuition is that when the
threshold rises and it is still likely that the public good will be provided, individual contributions
will rise, but contributions drop dramatically when too many contributions are needed for
provision. To summarize, in a quantal response equilibrium, a higher step return ratio leads to
more contributions when it is due to a higher total value of the public good or a lower cost of
provision, but not necessarily when it is due to an increase in the number of potential contributors
or to a lower threshold. Thus the (admittedly theoretical) analysis here yields only qualified
support for the use of the step return as a rough measure of the propensity to contribute in a
binary step-level public goods game.
19
Of course, even when individual contributions rise in response to the increased threshold,
the probability that the public good is actually provided may decrease, since more people are
needed to meet the threshold. For the numeric example represented in Figure 4, the probability
of success drops from .83 to .62 to practically 0 when n
* is increased from 3 to 5 to 8. Van de
Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) report an experiment that implemented a step-level public goods
game with binary contributions and found that increasing the number of contributors needed for
success reduced the incidence of successful provision. The next proposition shows that these
findings are in line with QRE predictions when there is sufficient noise.
Proposition 4. For a high enough error rate, µ, the quantal response equilibrium for the step-
level public goods game is unique and predicts that individual contributions first rise and then
fall with the threshold, n
*, while the probability of successful provision always decreases with n
*.
18 See, for instance, Offerman, Schram, and Sonnemans (1997) for experimental evidence on some of these
comparative static results.
19 Nor are the numbers effects in a Nash equilibrium necessarily consistent with the qualitative properties of the
step return ratio. This is because an increase in the threshold n* shifts the maximum of the expected-payoff-difference
line to the right in Figure 4, which is likely to shift the right-most (stable) mixed Nash equilibrium to the right. Thus a
rise in n*, which lowers the step return, can raise the mixed Nash contribution probability.
20This proposition, which is proved in the Appendix, is illustrated in Figure 5, which was
Figure 5. QRE Probabilities of Individual Contribution and Successful Group Provision
of a Step Level Public Good, as a Function of the Provision Point
drawn for the case where V =6 ,c=1 ,N= 10, µ = 1.5, and with the provision point, n
*, varying
from 1 to 9. A movement to the right in the figure corresponds to an increase in the number of
contributors needed for successful provision, which reduces the probability of success in a quantal
response equilibrium. As the step level is increased, individual contributions first increase to
meet the challenge, and then fall as the threshold becomes more unattainable. Interestingly,
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) derive this result in an equivalent manner by introducing random,
individual-specific "joy of giving" (or "warm-glow" altruism) shocks that are added to a person’s
payoff for a contribution decision.
20 Proposition 4 extends their analysis by showing that the
20 The Nash equilibrium for the resulting game of incomplete information is mathematically equivalent to a quantal
response equilibrium. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) prove that individual contributions first rise and then fall with the
threshold (see their Table 2). They also show that the number of potential contributors, N, has the reverse effect:
individual contributions first fall and then rise with increases in N.
21probability of successful provision is decreasing in n
*.
Finally, it is interesting to see how contribution behavior changes as multiple steps, or
thresholds are introduced. Suppose, for instance, that in addition to the n
* = 5 threshold, there
is another threshold at n
* = 8: with five or more contributions, everyone receives a return of 1
from the public good, while with eight contributions or more, the return is 2. This multiple-step
case can be analyzed in the same manner as before. Now there are two points at which one’s
contribution can be pivotal, and the expected payoff is the sum of the two effects. In terms of
Figure 4, the expected payoff lines for n
* = 5 and n
* = 8 get "summed," as indicated by the
n
* = {5,8} line in Figure 4 (the cost of contributing only enters once, which is why the endpoints
of the dotted line are still at -1). The introduction of the extra threshold at n
*=8, which by itself
leads to a low contribution probability, dramatically increases contributions: the QRE contribution
probability is .73 and the probability that at least five people contribute is as high as .97. An
immediate extension of this analysis is that adding more steps, without reducing the payoff
increment at any of the existing steps, will increase quantal response contribution probabilities
in a binary public goods game.
VI. Voting Participation Games
Another binary choice of considerable interest is the decision of whether or not to vote
in a small-group situation where voting is costly and a single vote has a non-negligible effect on
the final outcome, e.g. the decision of whether to attend a faculty meeting on a busy day. The
analysis is similar to that of a step-level public goods game, since the threshold contribution, n
*,
corresponds to the number of votes needed to pass a favored bill. In a real voting contest,
however, the vote total required to win is endogenously determined by the number of people
voting against the bill. If there are two types of voters, those who favor a bill and those who
oppose, then the equilibrium will be characterized by a participation probability for each type.
Here we restrict attention to a symmetric model with equal numbers of voters of each type, equal
costs of voting, c, and symmetric valuations: V if the preferred outcome receives more votes and
0 otherwise. Ties in this majority rule game are decided by the flip of a coin. Note that the
public goods incentives to free ride are still present in this game, since voters benefit when their
22side wins, regardless of whether or not they incurred the cost of voting.
The analysis of the majority voting game is a straightforward application of the approach
taken in the previous sections. The gain from a favorable outcome is V, so the expected payoff
difference is V times the probability that one’s vote affects the outcome minus the cost of voting.
(Obviously, the net cost of voting could be small or even negative if voting is psychologically
rewarding or if there are social pressures to vote, e.g. to attend a faculty meeting.) Since a tie
is decided by the flip of a coin, the probability that a vote is pivotal is one-half times the
probability that it creates or breaks a tie. In a symmetric equilibrium with common participation
probability, p, it is straightforward to use the binomial formulas to calculate these probabilities,
and the expected payoff difference for voting is then V/2 times this "influence probability" minus
the cost of voting.
21
Figure 6 shows the expected payoff difference as a function of the common participation
probability, which is labeled "majority rule." The parameters that were used to construct this
figure are taken from Schram and Sonnemans (1996b) who conducted an experiment based on
this game form with N =6 ,V= 2.5, and c = 1. The "U" shape of the expected payoff difference
reflects the fact that a costly vote is wasted when the preferred outcome is already winning, or
when it cannot win even with an extra vote. Indeed, the expected value of a vote is highest when
either no one else or everyone else votes, since a vote is then guaranteed to be pivotal by
breaking or creating a tie. In contrast, when all others vote with probability 1/2, one extra vote
is likely to be superfluous or not enough and its expected value is therefore small. As in
previous sections, the mixed Nash prediction is determined by where the expected payoff
21 Suppose there are two groups of equal size, N, and consider a player in group 1. The player’s vote is pivotal
only when the number of voters in group 1 is equal to n2 -1o rn 2, where n2 denotes the number of voters in group 2,
which happens with probability:
where, as before, p denotes that probability with which all others (in both groups) vote. The first term represents the
probability that a tie is created and the second term is the probability that a tie is broken. A player’s expected payoff is
V/2 times this "influence probability" minus c, the cost of voting.
23difference line crosses the zero line: there are two Nash equilibria, one in which almost no one
Figure 6. Nash and Quantal Response Voting Probabilities
Under Majority and Proportional Rules
votes and another in which almost everyone votes (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983).
The quantal response equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the expected payoff
difference line and the inverse distribution function (dark lines).
22 The µ parameter of 0.8 used
to construct the steeper line was selected so that the QRE prediction would be at about the same
level (30 to 50 percent) as the vote participation probabilities reported by Schram and Sonnemans
(1996b) in the initial periods of their experiment. Interestingly, the voting probabilities started
22 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) use essentially the same techniques to determine the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
in a voting game with incomplete information. In their paper, individual cost-of-voting shocks are added to each person’s
payoffs. The resulting Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is mathematically equivalent to a quantal response equilibrium.
24high and then decreased to stabilize somewhere in the 20 to 30 percent range. This downward
trend is crudely captured by a reduction in the noise parameter µ to 0.4 as indicated by the
second inverse distribution line in Figure 6.
23
Schram and Sonnemans (1996b) also considered a "proportional rule" game in which each
Figure 7. Voting Participation Rates with Random Matching
Source: Schram and Sonnemans (1996b)
person’s payoff is the proportion of votes for their preferred outcome, minus the cost of voting
if they voted. Again, it is straightforward to use the binomial formula to calculate the expected
proportion of favorable votes, contingent on one’s own decision of whether to vote, as a function
23 Alternatively, this downward adjustment could be explained by the µ = .4 line, together with the dynamic stability
argument in Section II that produces directional movements of the type indicated by the arrows on the horizontal axis of
Figure 2.
25of the common participation probability, p.
24 The expected payoff difference for this
proportional representation game is the increase in the expected proportion of favorable votes,
minus the cost of voting. This difference is declining everywhere because one’s vote has a
smaller impact on the vote proportion as the probability of others’ participation increases. The
expected payoff difference line is labeled "proportional rule" in Figure 6, where the parameters
are again taken from Schram and Sonnemans (1996b): N =6 ,V= 2.22, and c = 0.7. The Schram
and Sonnemans data for the proportional rule experiments, plotted as the lower line in Figure 7,
started in the 30 to 40 percent range and ended up between 20 and 30 percent in the final
periods. Note that participation is initially higher with the majority rule than with the
proportional rule, while this difference disappears in the final periods of the experiment when the
voting probabilities are close to 25 percent, well above the Nash predictions for these games.
This result is not surprising from a QRE point of view, since the two expected payoff difference
lines cross at p=.25 at which they intersect with the inverse distribution line (for µ = 0.4). The
result, however, is unexplainable by a Nash analysis for which the intersection of the two
expected payoff difference lines plays no role and only "crossings at zero" matter. For the
parameter values of the experiment, these crossings are at p=.05 and p=.95 for the majority rule
treatment and at p = .09 for the proportional rule treatment, and seem to have little predictive
power for the results of the Schram and Sonnemans (1996b) experiment.
25 To summarize, both
the qualitative data patterns as well as the magnitude of the observed voting probabilities are
consistent with a QRE analysis (but not with Nash), as can be seen from Figures 6 and 7.
This general approach may be extended to cover cases with asymmetries, e.g. when one
type is more numerous than another. With asymmetries, the equilibrium will consist of a
24 Using the same notation as before, the expected payoff difference for a player in group 1 is:
where the outside sum pertains to the decisions of the N-1 others of one’s own type, and the inside sum pertains to the
N voters of the other type.
25 See also Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) for a similar experiment with slightly different parameter values.
26participation probability for each type. These two probabilities will be determined by two
equations analogous to (1), with the expected payoff for participation (voting) being a function
of the number of potential voters of each type and the equilibrium participation probabilities.
While a simple graphical analysis of this asymmetric model is not possible, it is straightforward
to proceed with numerical calculations, for example, to show that the smaller group is more
likely to vote when the costs of voting are symmetric.
VII. Conclusion
Many strategic situations are characterized by binary decisions, e.g. whether or not to
vote, volunteer, attend a congested event, or perform a costly task with public benefits. In this
paper we present a simple model of equilibrium behavior that applies to a wide variety of
seemingly unrelated binary-choice games, including coordination, public goods, entry,
participation, and volunteer’s dilemma games. The model captures the feature that the decision
of whether or not to participate may be affected by randomness, either in preferences (e.g. entry
or voting costs) or in decision making (due to perception or calculation errors). The resulting
quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) incorporates this randomness in the
form of an error parameter and nests the standard rational-choice Nash equilibrium as a limiting
case. The quantal response equilibrium tracks many behavioral deviations from Nash predictions,
e.g. the tendency for entry to match the Nash predictions when the prediction is 1/2, and for
excess entry when the Nash prediction is below 1/2. In other words, a model with behavioral
noise is capable of explaining the "magical" accuracy of Nash predictions in some experiments
and the systematic deviations in others. The observed over-entry when Nash predictions are low
is analogous to the over-participation in voting experiments, which is explained by a quantal
response analysis. The participation rates in these experiments are roughly the same for the
majority and proportional outcome rule treatments, which are consistent with theoretical
calculations for the parameters used in the experiments. Similarly, the quantal response model
tracks intuitive "numbers effects" observed in volunteers’ dilemma and step-level public goods
experiments, both when these effects are consistent with Nash predictions and when they are not.
Taken together, these results indicate that standard "rational-choice" game theory can be enriched
in a manner that increases its behavioral relevance for a wide class of situations. Moreover, the
27simple nature of the graphical equilibrium analysis will aid researchers in other binary choice
applications.
28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The probability, P, that no one volunteers is given by (1-p)
N, where the
QRE probability of volunteering, p, satisfies:
Combining these equations and using the fact that F




allows one to express (A1) in terms of the probability that no one volunteers:
from which the derivative of P with respect to N can be established as:
(A2)
Note that dP/dN can only be non-negative when µ £ P
1-2/N Bf ( F
-1(P
1/N)). The right side of this
inequality is bounded by B max(f), so dP/dN has to be negative for large enough µ. Finally,
suppose, in contradiction, that limN®¥P > 0. This implies that P
1/N tends to 1, so µF
-1(P
1/N) ®
¥ when µ > 0. This contradicts (A2) since the right side limits to C - BP , which is finite.
Hence, P tends to zero when N tends to infinity. In fact, from (A2) it follows that for large N,
P converges to F(C/µ)
N, which tends to zero since F(C/ µ )<1f o rµ>0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The QRE probability of contributing, p, satisfies:
where w ³ 1 denotes the threshold and Pw
N(p) is the probability that w-1 out of the N-1 others
(A3)
contributed (see equation (6)). The solution to (A3) is unique when the derivative of the left side
is everywhere greater than that of the right side. The derivative of Pw
N(p) with respect to p is
given by ((w-1)/p -( N - w )/(1-p))Pw
N(p) and the relevant condition for uniqueness is therefore:




The latter expression can be rewritten as (N-1) Vf ( F
-1(p))Pw-1
N-1, which is bounded by (N-1)
Vmax(f). So for µ > (N-1) Vmax(f), the quantal response probability of contributing is unique
for all values of the threshold. The derivative of Pw
N(p) with respect to w < N (holding p fixed)
is Pw+1
N(p)-P w
N( p ), which simplifies to: Pw
N(p)( 1-w /(N-w) (1-p)/p). Together with (A3) this
implies that the derivative of the QRE probability, p, with respect to the threshold, w, is given
by:
Note that the denominator of the second term is positive when the condition for a unique QRE
(A5)
(eq. (A4)) is satisfied. The sign of dp/dw is then determined by the numerator which is positive
iff p ³ w/N. The intuition for this result is straightforward: as long as the "inverse distribution"
line intersects the "expected payoff difference" line to the right of its maximum (i.e. p > w/N),
an increase in w shifts the expected payoff difference to the right and moves the intersection
point upwards. The reverse happens for higher values of w when the inverse distribution line
cuts the expected payoff difference line to the left of the maximum (see also Palfrey and
Rosenthal, 1982).
The probability, Qw
N, that the public good is provided is given by
and its derivative with respect to w (for w< N) is:
Combining (A5) and (A6) shows that Qw
N is decreasing in w. Q.E.D.
(A6)
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